Consequences to directors of shareholder activism by SHIN, Sa-Pyung Sean et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Accountancy School of Accountancy
5-2016
Consequences to directors of shareholder activism
Sa-Pyung Sean SHIN
Singapore Management University, sshin@smu.edu.sg
Sa-Pyung Sean SHIN
Suraj SRINIVASAN
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research
Part of the Accounting Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Accountancy at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Accountancy by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
SHIN, Sa-Pyung Sean; SHIN, Sa-Pyung Sean; and SRINIVASAN, Suraj. Consequences to directors of shareholder activism. (2016).
1-60. Research Collection School Of Accountancy.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1590
 Consequences to Directors of 
Shareholder Activism   
Ian D. Gow 
Sa-Pyung Sean Shin 
Suraj Srinivasan    
Working Paper 14-071 
  
Working Paper 14-071 
 
 
Copyright © 2014, 2016 by Ian D. Gow, Sa-Pyung Sean Shin, and Suraj Srinivasan 
Working papers are in draft form. This working paper is distributed for purposes of comment and discussion only. It may 
not be reproduced without permission of the copyright holder. Copies of working papers are available from the author. 
 
 
 
Consequences to Directors of 
Shareholder Activism  
  
Ian D. Gow 
Harvard Business School 
Sa-Pyung Sean Shin 
Harvard Business School 
Suraj Srinivasan 
Harvard Business School  
 
 
  
Consequences to Directors of Shareholder Activism 
 
 
Ian D. Gow 
igow@hbs.edu 
 
Sa-Pyung Sean Shin 
sshin@hbs.edu 
 
Suraj Srinivasan 
ssrinivasan@hbs.edu 
 
May 26, 2016 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Using a comprehensive sample for 2004–2012, we examine the impact of shareholder activist 
campaigns on the careers of directors of targeted firms. We find that activism is associated with 
directors being almost twice as likely to leave—and performance-sensitivity of turnover being 
higher over the subsequent two-year period. Our evidence suggests that director turnover occurs 
even without shareholder activists engaging in, let alone winning, proxy contests and, in contrast 
to most prior research, director election results matter. Overall, our evidence suggests that 
shareholder activism, even in the absence of proxy fights, is associated with greater 
accountability for independent directors. 
 
JEL Classification: G30; G34; J33; K22; M41. 
 
Keywords: Shareholder activism; hedge funds; Independent directors; Director reputation; 
Accountability; Shareholder voting 
 
All authors are at Harvard Business School. We thank John Coates, Lucian Bebchuk, and seminar 
participants at Cornell University, Harvard Business School, Harvard Law School, INSEAD, University 
of Miami, and University of Notre Dame for helpful comments. We thank the Division of Research at 
Harvard Business School for financial support. Stephanie Kreutz and Kristen Garner provided excellent 
research support.  
 1 
 
 
Consequences to Directors of Shareholder Activism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Using a comprehensive sample for 2004–2012, we examine the impact of shareholder activist 
campaigns on the careers of directors of targeted firms. We find that activism is associated with 
directors being almost twice as likely to leave—and performance-sensitivity of turnover being 
higher over the subsequent two-year period. Our evidence suggests that director turnover occurs 
even without shareholder activists engaging in, let alone winning, proxy contests and, in contrast 
to most prior research, director election results matter. Overall, our evidence suggests that 
shareholder activism, even in the absence of proxy fights, is associated with greater 
accountability for independent directors. 
 
 
 
  
 2 
Consequences to Directors of Shareholder Activism 
1. Introduction 
We examine career consequences for directors when firms are targeted by activist 
shareholders. Activism by hedge fund and other investors to improve governance and 
performance of companies has become a significant phenomenon in recent years. Many recent 
papers (e.g., Brav et al., 2008; Bebchuk et al., 2013) examine the performance consequences of 
such activism with a focus on identifying whether and how hedge fund activism improves firm 
performance. Our focus is on the consequences for the board of directors, a group that occupies a 
central place in corporate governance and in interactions with activist shareholders. One goal of 
this paper is to evaluate the claim in Bebchuk (2007) that shareholder power to replace directors 
is largely a “myth” and whether the recent rise of hedge fund activism ameliorates this concern. 
We use a sample of 1,490 activism events comprising all publicly disclosed shareholder 
activism conducted by hedge funds or other major shareholders between 2004 and 2012 to 
examine a number of different consequences for directors.
1
 First, we examine director turnover 
at firms subject to activism, including the effect of settlement with activists and the impact of 
activism on the performance-sensitivity of director turnover. Next, we examine whether activism 
is associated with reduced shareholder support in director elections and the relation between 
activism, shareholder support in director elections, and subsequent departure of directors. 
Finally, we examine changes in the number of board positions held by directors at other public 
firms as a proxy for reputational effects of shareholder activism.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, we provide evidence 
that an important class of shareholder activism is associated with career costs for directors, even 
                                                 
1
 Here “major shareholders” means those filing a Form 13D with the Securities and Exchange Commission after 
reaching an ownership stake of more than five percent of shares. 
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when such activism does not result in a proxy contest or even relate to demand for board 
representation. While proxy contests rarely succeed in getting a majority of shareholder support 
(Bebchuk, 2007), Fos and Tsoutsouras (2014) show that proxy contests are associated with 
director turnover. This result is to be expected since activists in proxy contests explicitly propose 
an alternate slate of candidates to replace incumbents. Consistent with Fos and Tsoutsouras 
(2014), we find that directors targeted by activists in proxy fights are significantly more likely to 
leave the board after the activism event: 21.4 percent of directors are no longer on the board of 
targeted firms at the end of the year after the activism is initiated compared to 12.5 percent for 
non-targeted firms. 
However, proxy contests represent just 25% of the events in the total set of activist 
engagements that we study, and those that proceed to contested elections are just 8%. Among the 
larger set of activism events that do not lead to a proxy fight, we find that even when activists 
target firms without public board-related demands, director turnover is 15.7% by the end of the 
second year after the activism is initiated. And when activists seek board representation, but do 
not initiate a proxy contest, turnover is 20.7%, similar to the 21.4% when proxy contests do 
occur. Thus, our results complement those of Fos and Tsoutsouras (2014) who study proxy 
contests, by showing that shareholder activism is associated with higher levels of director 
turnover even when such activism does not involve proxy contests, let alone proxy contests that 
get majority shareholder support. These higher departure rates hold for both inside and 
independent directors. All these results hold after controlling for firm performance and other 
factors driving director turnover and activism and when we use propensity score matching to 
identify control firms. Furthermore, as discussed below, within-firm analyses suggest a causal 
explanation for the relation between activism and the increased turnover we observe. 
 4 
Second, we provide evidence on the complex nature of negotiations between shareholders 
(including activists) and firms. Gantchev (2013) models an activism campaign as a sequential 
multi-period game involving escalating costs to the activist and provides empirical estimates of 
the costs of each stage. By providing evidence of increased levels of director turnover in 
categories of activism that fall short of proxy contests, or even observable demands for board 
representation, our paper provides evidence consistent with the existence of the kind of complex 
process modeled by Gantchev (2013). For example, we show that director turnover is actually 
higher when firms settle with activists than when activists cease campaigns, and 
indistinguishable from turnover from proxy contests that actually proceed to shareholder votes. 
Third, we provide evidence on the interplay between activism and other dimensions of 
director accountability. We show that activism is associated with higher levels of performance 
sensitivity of director turnover suggesting higher director accountability for poor firm 
performance. This increased sensitivity of turnover to poor firm performance holds even when 
activism does not involve a proxy contest. 
Fourth, we provide new evidence on director elections - we find that shareholders 
penalize directors with lower support in director elections when the firm is targeted by activists 
but that the effect is relatively limited. We find that directors receive 8.6 percent negative vote in 
the year of activism and 8.1 percent in the year after activism compared with less than 6 percent 
for non-targeted firms. One plausible explanation for this seemingly small effect is that many 
activism events are settled, perhaps because the board settles when shareholder support is 
particularly weak. 
We also find that negative votes in director elections (i.e., votes withheld from a director 
or votes for a rival candidate) are associated with director turnover. This is in contrast to Cai et 
 5 
al. (2009) who, using a sample of director elections from 2003 and 2004, do not find an 
association between a measure of negative votes and director turnover. This suggests that, in the 
context of activism, directors heed the message in the negative vote and resign their positions, 
though it is unclear what compels them to do so given that they still receive majority support in 
most cases. In this regard, our evidence is consistent with that of Fos, Li, and Tsoutsoura (2016), 
who provide evidence that directors are sensitive to director elections.
2
 
Finally, our paper also adds to the body of research that examines labor market 
consequences of director performance. Empirical research has provided evidence consistent with 
the Fama and Jensen (1983) conjecture that the market for directorships rewards or penalizes 
director performance (e.g., Srinivasan, 2005; Fich and Shivdasani, 2007). Prior research has 
considered directorships as an indication of director prestige (Fich and Shivdasani, 2007; 
Yermack, 2004), suggesting that if being targeted by activists were viewed as an indication of 
poor director performance, directors would lose seats on other boards. We find no evidence of an 
impact of activism on director reputation as reflected in directorships on other boards. Even 
directly targeted directors experience no loss in other directorships and this apparent non-effect 
holds for both inside and independent directors. In this regard, our results stand in contrast to 
those in Fos and Tsoutsoura (2014), who find evidence of other directorships being affected by 
proxy fights; this difference is likely due to difficult-to-reconcile differences in measurement of 
outside directorships and sample period.
3
 
While our results are suggestive of activism causing increased turnover of directors even 
when activism does not involve proxy fights or explicit demands for board representation, it is 
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 In addition, the discussion of the underlying mechanism on pp. 21–23 of Fos, Li, and Tsoutsoura (2016) provides 
several examples in which activist investors are a driving force in director accountability. 
3
 As discussed below in Section 8.1 we attempt to replicate their analyses using our sample, but find results similar 
to those in our main analyses. Results from these analyses are found in the Internet Appendix. 
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difficult to draw unequivocally causal inferences from associations because activists do not 
select target firms at random. It is possible that activists target those firms possessing unobserved 
characteristics associated with director turnover. To partially address this concern, we conduct 
within-firm analyses comparing directors that are individually targeted by activists with directors 
who are not. We believe causal inference is more appropriate with these tests and they provide 
results that are consistent with our main analyses. 
It is important to note some caveats that apply, even if causal inferences are appropriate. 
First, it is difficult to discern from public data the precise mechanism through which activism 
causes director turnover. It is difficult to distinguish empirically a director who leaves the board 
in response to activist demands for his or her departure from one who leaves the board because 
the activism imposes additional personal costs on him or her. Second, our paper does not speak 
to the optimality of activist-driven director turnover. While prior research has found evidence 
consistent with increased performance-sensitivity increasing firm value (Weisbach, 1988) and 
we find evidence of shareholder activism being associated with greater performance sensitivity 
of director turnover, it is difficult to conclude from our evidence whether turnover following 
activism is optimal. However, whether departure is voluntary, optimal, or otherwise, our 
evidence does suggest that activism is associated with career consequences for directors. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes features of shareholder 
activism campaigns and the prior literature. Section 3 describes our data and descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 discusses director turnover in targeted companies. Section 5 examines voting 
results. Section 6 examines reputational impact on other boards. Section 7 examines 
consequences to directors targeted individually by activists. Section 8 provides additional 
analyses and Section 9 concludes. 
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2. Prior research and institutional setting 
2.1. Director turnover 
Prior papers provide evidence that directors lose their positions when firms experience 
financial crises or financial misconduct. For instance, greater director turnover is observed in 
firms subject to securities litigation (Romano, 1991; Brochet and Srinivasan, 2013), firms in 
financial distress (Gilson, 1990), companies that report accounting restatements (Srinivasan, 
2005), and firms that backdated options (Ertimur et al. 2012).
4
 Overall, the evidence points to 
higher board turnover after poor performance, consistent with directors being held accountable 
for monitoring failures. While these papers examine board turnover, they generally do not 
explore the mechanisms that bring this about. We identify shareholder activism as one such 
mechanism and seek to understand the effect of different kinds of direct shareholder action on 
director turnover. 
While we focus on director turnover at firms targeted by activist shareholders, we also 
examine directors’ reputational consequences by looking at the effect of shareholder activism on 
directorships at other firms. Our paper is therefore related to the literature on director reputation, 
which shows that directors incur labor market penalties when they are perceived as weak 
monitors (Srinivasan, 2005; Fich and Shivdasani, 2007).  
2.2 Effect of shareholder votes and institutional shareholder activism 
Prior research has found that shareholders use voting in director elections as a way to 
communicate dissatisfaction with performance. Cai, Garner, and Walking (2009) find that 
directors receive fewer votes after a securities lawsuit and when the director serves on the board 
                                                 
4
 In contrast with these papers, other papers find that director turnover is unchanged after fraud (Agarwal, Jaffe, and 
Karpoff, 1999) and after litigation (Fich and Shivdasani, 2007). 
 8 
of another firm that faces a shareholder lawsuit. Ertimur, Ferri, and Maber (2012) find that 
compensation committee members of option backdating firms receive fewer votes than other 
directors in these firms.
5
 
Grundfest (1993) suggests that directors value their reputation as monitors and therefore 
respond to negative shareholder votes even when such votes are not binding. Consistent with 
this, prior literature provides evidence consistent with shareholder voting having some efficacy 
in bringing about changes in corporate policy. Del Guercio, Seery, and Woidtke (2008) provide 
evidence that firms respond to “vote no” campaigns by activist institutional investors by 
improving operating performance, increasing CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, and making 
governance changes. Ertimur et al. (2010) find that CEOs who receive excess pay and are 
targeted by “vote no” campaigns subsequently receive lower compensation. 
While prior research suggests directors heed the message conveyed by these campaigns, 
it is not clear that directors are more likely to leave the board in the face of weak shareholder 
support. With plurality voting, which most firms in the US used until recently (Ertimur et al., 
2013), a director is elected even if a minority of shareholders vote in his or her favor since 
shareholders can only withhold votes and cannot vote against a director. Consistent with such 
voting being ineffective, Cai et al. (2009) find no relationship between the percent of withheld 
votes and subsequent director turnover. In contrast, Fischer et al. (2009) find that board-level 
shareholder approval is negatively associated with board-level turnover, albeit using a much 
smaller sample. With majority voting, which has been adopted by many firms in recent years, 
directors are not elected unless a majority of votes are cast in their favor. However, Ertimur et al. 
(2013) find that votes withheld are not related to director turnover even with majority voting. 
                                                 
5
 Yermack (2010) contains a comprehensive review of the larger shareholder voting literature. 
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Even when directors fail to win a majority vote, which is itself a rare occurrence, turnover is 
infrequent and is not related to the voting outcome, regardless of the election standard. We add to 
the literature on director elections by examining how shareholder activism and shareholder 
voting coexist in affecting director turnover and, by providing evidence that shareholder voting 
has a significant effect on board turnover. Our results can help explain why directors are 
responsive to shareholder concerns expressed by votes in director elections. 
2.3 Director elections and proxy fights 
The apparent ineffectiveness of uncontested elections has led to the concern that the only 
way for shareholders to remove underperforming directors is to initiate a proxy solicitation 
campaign in a contested election. Contested elections are contests between the incumbent set of 
directors put forward by the company and a dissident slate nominated by an outside investor. 
Dodd and Warner (1983) provide early evidence consistent with proxy fights being value-
creating for shareholders. They find a statistically significant positive share price effect 
associated with a proxy contest regardless of whether the contest was successful or not. 
However, a number of studies find limits to the effectiveness of proxy contests. While Mulherin 
and Poulsen (1998) find evidence “that proxy contests create value” using a sample of 270 proxy 
contests covering 1979−1994, they also find that “the bulk of the wealth gains stemming from 
firms that are acquired.” Pound (1988) identifies cost of waging a proxy contest and management 
incumbency as impediments to successful proxy fights. More recently, Bebchuk (2007) claims 
that shareholders’ power to replace the board is largely a “myth,” due to free-rider issues 
associated with investing in costly proxy contents. Fos, Li, and Tsoutsoura (2016) provide 
evidence consistent with directors being more sensitive to shareholder concerns when elections 
are sooner. We contribute to this debate by providing evidence consistent with directors being 
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held accountable for firm performance in the presence of shareholder activism, even when such 
activism does not involve a proxy contest. 
2.4 Hedge fund and other institutional activism 
As hedge fund activism is a recent phenomenon, the focus of earlier research was on the 
effect of shareholder activism by pension and labor union funds. This research focused on the 
activities of pension plans, such as CalPERS (Smith, 1996) and TIAA-CREF (Carleton, Nelson, 
and Weisbach, 1998). While pension plans have typically focused on governance changes 
generally proposed as 14a-8 shareholder proposals, hedge funds often seek to make more wide-
ranging changes to the firms they target (see Appendix B for examples). One conclusion from 
research on pension plan activism is that activist shareholders and firms often reach agreement 
without a formal 14a-8 proposal being voted upon – for instance Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach 
(1998) find that TIAA-CREF is able to reach agreements with targeted companies 95 percent of 
the time and in over 70 percent of cases without a shareholder vote on the proposal. In the UK, 
Becht et al. (2008) study a mutual fund (Hermes) and find that this fund acts “predominantly 
through private interventions.” This is consistent with our finding that activism is associated with 
board turnover, even when there is no formal proxy fight.  
Over the last decade, the phenomenon of shareholder activism has been driven in large part 
by activist hedge funds and more recent research has examined this form of activism. Brav, 
Jiang, and Kim (2010) suggest that structural benefits enjoyed by hedge funds—such as fewer 
regulations and improved incentives—have allowed them to be more active than mutual funds or 
pension funds in pursuing governance changes in companies.  
A more recent paper, Fos and Tsoutsouras (2014), shows that proxy contests are 
associated with consequences for director of affected firms. While our paper is similar in some 
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respects, it differs in others. First and most importantly, Fos and Tsoutsoura (2014) focus 
exclusively on proxy contests, while we examine other forms of shareholder activism and find 
that these are also associated with director turnover. Director turnover in the context of proxy 
contests should be less surprising, whereas our finding that director turnover accompanies hedge 
fund activism provides a broader context for understanding how board governance is shaped by 
activism. In addition, we examine voting outcomes and performance sensitivity of director 
turnover. In these regards, our paper complements and extends the findings of Fos and 
Tsoutsoura (2014). Finally, Fos and Tsoutsoura (2014) find that other directorships decline for 
directors targeted in proxy fights relative to their non-targeted colleagues on the same boards, 
while we do not find evidence of this effect in our sample.
6
 
Our paper also relates to Gantchev (2013), who models activism as a sequential decision 
process with activism potentially escalating from negotiations with management and requests for 
board representation to, ultimately, proxy contests. A key element of the analysis in Gantchev 
(2013) is an estimate of the cost of a typical proxy contest of $10.71 million, an amount equal to 
two-thirds of the gross returns from the typical activism campaign. Focusing on director 
turnover, our paper complements Gantchev (2013) by showing that activists often appear able to 
effect change without pursuing costly proxy contests. 
Prior research suggests that hedge fund activists typically target smaller firms, value-
oriented firms (low market-to-book), and firms with sound operating cash flows but low sales 
growth, leverage and dividend payouts (Brav et al., 2010). This evidence motivates us to 
introduce firm-level covariates to control for factors causing firms to be targeted by activist 
investors. 
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 We discuss our attempt to reconcile our results with theirs in Section 8.1 below. 
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3. Data and sample description 
Our analysis uses data on directors, firms, and activism events. Each of these is described 
in turn. 
3.1 Directorship data  
Our sample consists of all directorships held in firms in the Equilar database for fiscal 
years ending between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2012.
7
 The data in Equilar comprises 
directors of every company that files both an annual report and an annual proxy statement (forms 
10-K and DEF 14A, respectively) with the SEC. This database provides us with names and other 
director characteristics. Drawing on data from both Equilar and BoardEx (another widely used 
database on directors), we construct an identifier for each director that allows us to track 
directors across firms and over time.  
3.2 Firm-level data 
Most firm-level financial data come from Compustat and CRSP. Our source for data on 
voting is ISS Voting Analytics, which provides data about matters voted on at shareholder 
meetings between 2001 and 2012 for a sample that roughly corresponds to the Russell 3000 
index. We get analyst coverage from I/B/E/S and institutional ownership data from 
WhaleWisdom, which provides comprehensive coverage of 13F and 13F/A filings. 
3.3 Activism events 
Our data on activism comes from FactSet’s SharkWatch database, which contains 
information on shareholder activism events, primarily in the United States. From SharkWatch, 
we collect information on all publicly disclosed activism events that commenced in the period 
                                                 
7
 Because we examine outcomes up to two years after an activism event, data availability limits our ability to 
construct a full sample for more recent activism events. 
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2004−2012, where the event is not a corporate control contest initiated by another corporation 
and the targeted firm is incorporated in the United States and is not an investment trust or mutual 
fund. This provides us with 1,490 activism events, which are primarily conducted by hedge fund 
activists or other major shareholders (i.e., 13D filers). Note that this does not include activism 
consisting only of routine shareholder proposals submitted under Rule 14a-8.  
We classify these 1,490 activism (Targeted Firm) events into three mutually exclusive 
subcategories: Targeted Firm – Non-Board, Targeted Board – Non-Proxy, and Targeted Board – 
Proxy. All activism events not related to a demand for board representation are classified as 
Targeted Firm – Non-Board. We classify as Targeted Board – Non-Proxy all events identified 
by SharkWatch as relating to “Board Representation,” “Board Control,” “Remove Directors(s),” 
or “Withhold Vote for Director(s),” but which do not result in a formal declaration of a contested 
director election (proxy fight). We classify as Targeted Board – Proxy as activism events that 
resulted in a declared proxy fight. This is measured as both (i) activism events involving filings 
on forms DEFC14A and PREC14A and (ii) cases where the dissident publicly disclosed that it 
delivered formal notice to the company that it intends to solicit proxies from stockholders. 
Appendix A provides definitions of all variables used in the analysis. Appendix B provides 
examples of activism events in each of the above categories. 
Of the total sample of 1,490 events, 614 events are board-related (377 as Targeted Board 
– Proxy and 237 Targeted Board – Non-Proxy) and the remaining 876 relate to other campaigns 
by shareholders. Table 1 Panel A provides a distribution of the sample by year and by category. 
We observe no particular time series patterns in the nine years of data for any of the subgroups 
except for a slightly higher overall rate of activism in 2007 and 2008. There are no obvious 
patterns in the activism subcategories. Nevertheless, we include year fixed effects in all our 
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multivariate tests to account for any year-specific effects. Several of our analyses use director-
firm-years as the units of observation and Table 1 Panel B provides the number of such 
observations by year and category of activism. 
Table 1 Panel C provides univariate statistics on director turnover on the board for the 
five years after shareholder activism. As a benchmark, in the measurement window that we use 
for our multivariate tests (two-year window from t to t + 2), we observe a director turnover rate 
of 12.5 percent for firms that are not targeted for any form of activism (Non-Targeted Firm) that 
remain in our sample for that period. The comparable turnover rate for companies targeted for 
shareholder activism (Targeted Firm) is significantly higher at 18.0 percent in the two-year 
period that includes the initiation of the activism and the year following it. For non-proxy fight, 
board-related activism (Targeted Board – Non-Proxy), 20.9 percent of directors leave in two 
years. Proxy fights (Targeted Board – Proxy) also exhibit greater director turnover with a 21.4 
percent departure rate. We explore these results further using multivariate regressions of director 
departure in the next section. 
Table 1 Panel D presents univariate statistics for voting support in director elections for 
the year prior to activism (t) to the year after initiation of activism (t + 2). Against Votes 
represents the percentage of votes from director election voted “against” each director, calculated 
for uncontested elections as (voted against + voted withheld) divided by (voted for + voted 
against + voted withheld). For contested elections, the calculation is similar, but we treat votes 
for one director as votes against the rival director. ISS Against represents an unfavorable voting 
recommendation for each individual director nominee by Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS), a leading proxy advisory firm. The average director in a firm not targeted for activism 
(Non-Targeted Firm) receives 5.4 percent negative votes from shareholders and an unfavorable 
 15 
ISS recommendation in 10.4 percent of cases. Levels of negative votes and recommendations are 
higher for targeted companies. The average level of negative votes for directors of targeted firms 
(Targeted Firm) is 8.6 percent in the year of activism and 8.1 percent in the year after activism 
suggesting a continued negative sentiment against directors. The negative votes are 10.0 percent 
and 9.2 percent in years t + 1 and t + 2, respectively, for non-proxy, board-related activism 
(Targeted Board – Non-Proxy) and 9.6 percent and 7.2 percent for proxy fight events (Targeted 
Board – Proxy). We explore the lingering negative effect against directors of targeted firms in 
the multivariate regression analysis. 
In Table 1 Panel E, we provide univariate statistics for other directorships of our sample 
directors. The average director in a non-targeted firm has 0.610 directorships in other firms. This 
number reduces over next five years to 0.546. Other directorships of directors in targeted firms 
display a somewhat similar decline over time and this pattern is repeated in each category of 
targeted firms. While the univariate statistics do not suggest a pattern of differential impact 
between targeted and non-targeted firms, we explore the impact of activism on other 
directorships in a multivariate regression framework in section 6.
8
 
4. Director turnover in targeted companies 
In this section, we discuss our analyses of the relationship of shareholder activism and 
director turnover.  
4.1 Shareholder activism and director turnover 
We first examine how shareholder activism affects director turnover in target companies 
estimating the following specification for all director-firm-years in our sample. 
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Appendix Table IA1. 
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Departure(t, t+2) = F(Targeted Firm – Non-Board, Targeted Board – Non-Proxy,  
 Targeted Board – Proxy, firm controls, director controls, (1) 
  year fixed effects),   
where the dependent variable, Departure(t, t+2), takes the value 1 if a director of the firm in year t 
is no longer on the board in year t + 2. Targeted Firm – Non-Board takes the value 1 for all 
directors of a firm that is the target of a non-board related activism event in year t + 1. We 
classify activism events in which the activist seeks either the removal of existing directors or 
appointment of new ones into two groups—those that result in a declared proxy fight (Targeted 
Board – Proxy) and those that do not, due to settlement with the activist or the activist dropping 
its demands (Targeted Board – Non-Proxy). Declared proxy fights do not necessarily result in 
contested elections—the company and dissident might settle before going to a vote even after a 
proxy fight is initiated. The benchmark group consists of director-firm-years in the Equilar 
database related to firm-years where the firms were not targeted by activists. 
We also include firm, director, and activism characteristics as controls. Poor firm 
performance has been shown to be an important cause of director turnover (Gilson, 1990; 
Yermack, 2004). Brav et al. (2008) identify several firm characteristics that distinguish activism 
targets from other firms. We include these variables in the regression model so as to control for 
firm characteristics associated with activism. Firm-level controls include firm performance (Ind. 
Adj. Return, ROA, Sales Growth), log of market capitalization for firm size (Market Value), 
book-to-market ratio (Book-to-Market), leverage (Leverage), dividend payout ratio (Dividend), 
the number of analysts covering the firm (Analyst) and percent of shares held by institutional 
investors (Institution).  
Director characteristics include director age (Age), director tenure (Tenure) as we expect 
age and tenure to be positively associated with director turnover. We identify directors that are 
on the audit (Audit Committee) and compensation committees (Compensation Committee) as 
 17 
these directors are more likely to play a prominent role on the board (Yermack, 2004). We 
include year fixed effects to control for unobserved time-related effects. All standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level.
9
  
We examine director departure over a two-year period including the activism event. This 
allows us to examine up to two nomination cycles for companies with unitary boards. While 
directors in companies with staggered boards typically serve three-year terms and are not up for 
nomination within two years, this does not prevent these directors from leaving boards before 
their term ends. Ertimur, Ferri, and Maber (2012) also use a two-year measurement window, 
arguing that the effect of a shareholder campaign dissipates over time and longer time windows 
increase the likelihood of unrelated events affecting director turnover. 
Table 2 presents the results of an OLS regression of Equation 1. We tabulate an OLS 
regression for ease of interpretation of coefficients. (All inferences are identical when we 
conduct a logit regression - see Table IA2 of the Internet Appendix.) Table 2 Panel A presents 
results for all directors—independent, inside, and related or “gray” directors. Column 1 of Panel 
A presents results for all firms, including firms that disappear from Equilar because they were 
acquired or delisted (went private, bankrupt, etc.). In this analysis, directors can lose their 
positions either by leaving the board or by the firm ceasing to be a public company. Column 1 
results suggest that directors in firms targeted by activist shareholders are more likely to lose 
their board seats in the two-year period immediately following activism—the coefficient on 
Targeted Firm is positive and significant (coefficient = 16.23, p-value <0.01).  
Columns 2 and 3 of Panel A include only firms that continue to exist in year t + 2; in this 
way, the analysis focuses on the likelihood of directors leaving boards of firms that continue to 
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exist as public firms. The effect of being a director of a targeted company continues to remain 
positive and significant (coefficient on Targeted Firm = 8.88, p-value <0.01). A coefficient 
lower in magnitude than that reported in Column 1 is expected, as prior research (Greenwood 
and Schor, 2009) suggests that one consequence of activism is an increased probability of 
takeover and this is clearly one way in which board turnover can occur. However, the results in 
Column 2 suggest that directors face a significantly higher likelihood of turnover even when the 
company continues to exist as a separate entity. The OLS coefficient estimate implies an increase 
of 8.9 percentage points in the likelihood that a director will leave the board when the firm is 
targeted, which is a 71% increase over the 12.5 percent rate for non-targeted firms reported in 
Panel C of Table 1. The signs of the coefficients on control variables are as expected; e.g., 
directors are less likely to leave in better-performing firms (both ROA and stock returns) and in 
larger firms. Directors on the compensation or audit committees are less likely to leave the 
board. Older directors are more likely to turn over. 
Column 3 presents results using a finer classification of activism events. We find not only 
that directors from targeted firms are more likely to leave their company, but directors are also 
incrementally more likely to leave if their company is targeted by activists not seeking board 
representation or the removal of directors: the coefficients on Targeted Firm – Non-Board, 
Targeted Board – Non-Proxy, and Targeted Board – Proxy are all positive and significant and 
the coefficients are progressively higher (coefficients of 6.67, 9.97 and 12.77, respectively, with 
p-values < 0.01 in each case). Surprisingly, the coefficients on Targeted Board – Non-Proxy and 
Targeted Board – Proxy are not statistically distinguishable from each other (F-stat of F-stat of 
1.66, p-value = 0.20), suggesting that directors on boards targeted by activism resulting in a 
formal proxy fight have no greater likelihood of leaving than directors in firms with board-
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related activism that does not reach that level. In short, these results show that directors in firms 
targeted by shareholder for activism campaigns face increased likelihood of leaving the board of 
targeted firms, even when the activism is not explicitly directed at board representation and does 
not result in a proxy fight. 
In untabulated analysis, we include an indicator variable SharkWatch50, which identifies 
activism by the top 50 hedge fund activists, as classified by Factset based on the number of 
publicly disclosed campaigns waged and size of companies targeted. This set includes noted 
activist hedge funds such as Pershing Square, Relational Investors, Third Point, and Icahn 
Enterprises. Overall, 501 of the 1,490 events include a SharkWatch50 hedge fund in the dissident 
group. We use this classification to examine if outcomes are different when the activism is 
directed by these prominent activists. While we might expect that activism by more prominent 
investors would result in higher levels of turnover due to these investors being taken more 
seriously, we do not find evidence supporting this in our analysis; in fact the coefficient on 
SharkWatch50 is negative and equal to -2.83 (p-value < 0.10) suggesting that turnover is less 
likely in these cases. We also interacted SharkWatch50 with the activism classification variables, 
but found no statistically significant effects. 
In columns 4 and 5, we divide Departure(t, t+2) into Departure(t, t+1) and Departure(t+1, t+2), 
separately looking at directors who leave in year t+1 (Column 4) and year t+2 (Column 5), 
respectively. We do this to identify to what extent directors leave before the first election (t to 
t+1) when activism is announced and the extent to which directors leave after the first election 
(t+1 to t+2). Note that the coefficient on the activism variables in Column 3 will be the sum of 
the coefficients on the same variable in columns 4 and 5. The significant and positive 
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coefficients on all activism classifications suggest directors involved in activism events leave in 
the year of, as well as in the year after, activism. 
The results in columns 4 and 5 highlight that much director turnover occurs before the 
annual meeting in the year of the activism event—i.e., in the period (t, t+1)—especially when the 
activism does not involve a proxy fight. The positive and significant coefficient in Column 4 
(Departure(t, t+1)) for Targeted Board – Non-Proxy is consistent with board seats being granted to 
dissidents as part of settlement negotiation with the activist investors thereby preventing a proxy 
fight; in such cases, some incumbent directors would step down as part of the settlement. Some 
proxy fights likely represent cases where the firm and the activist did not reach a settlement and 
the activist escalated to a formal proxy fight. While turnover is greater in the period (t+1, t+2) for 
proxy fights, there is some increased turnover in the period (t, t+1) as well, consistent with 
directors yielding board seats prior to a vote when confronted with a potential proxy fight. 
Separating director turnover into two periods shows that a significant amount of turnover occurs 
concurrently with activism likely as a conflict-avoidance mechanism.  
In Panel B of Table 2 we separate the sample into independent directors and inside 
directors to examine possibly differential effects of activism on the two groups. Columns 1 
through 3 present coefficient estimates for the sample of independent directors and Columns 4 
through 6 for inside directors (“gray” or affiliated directors are dropped from the sample). In 
general, the results are very similar to those reported in Panel A of Table 2, so we focus on the 
differences. The estimated impact of being targeted is greater for inside directors (coefficient on 
Targeted Firm = 11.81, p-value < 0.01) than for independent directors (coefficient = 8.29, p-
value < 0.01); the difference is statistically significant (p-value < 0.05). The coefficients between 
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insider directors and independent directors are different in a statistically significant way when we 
examine by activism types as well except for cases of Targeted Firm – Non-Board.  
In untabulated regressions (tabulated in Panel C of Table IA2 of the Internet Appendix), 
we restrict the sample to CEOs. The estimated coefficients on the activism indicators are similar 
to those observed for inside directors in Panel B, consistent with many of the inside directors 
being CEOs.  
4.2 Shareholder activism and performance sensitivity of director turnover 
We next examine if activism increases the sensitivity of director turnover to poor firm 
performance. Prior literature (e.g., Weisbach, 1988) suggests that increased turnover-
performance sensitivity can be viewed as a positive governance effect. In Table 3, we examine 
the effect of activism on the performance sensitivity of director turnover using an OLS 
regression (the logit version is in the Internet Appendix Table IA3 and produces similar results). 
As the measure of performance, we use industry-adjusted returns over the twelve-month period 
ending four months after the fiscal year-end (i.e., the approximate time of the annual shareholder 
meeting). By extending the returns into the fiscal year after the activism event, if any, we pick up 
performance that is observed by shareholders and thus plausibly affects voting at the annual 
meeting.  
We find that performance sensitivity is significantly increased by shareholder activism: 
the coefficients on Ind. Adj. Return interacted with Targeted Firm is negative and significant (p-
value < 0.01). In the presence of activism, a one percentage-point decrease in industry-adjusted 
is associated with an incremental increase in the probability of turnover of all directors of 2.79% 
(p-value < 0.01) and 2.44% and 3.19% for independent and inside directors, respectively). We 
also examine performance sensitivity effects for each classification of activism events (Targeted 
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Firm – Non-Board, Targeted Board – Non-Proxy, and Targeted Board – Proxy) and, while the 
coefficients are all negative, they are most often not statistically significantly different from zero 
or from each other.
10
 Overall, the results in Panel A of Table 3 suggest that shareholder activism 
is a mechanism for enhancing board accountability for poor performance even when it does not 
involve a proxy fight.  
4.3 Settlements with activists and director turnover 
Next we examine the effect of settlements with activists on director turnover. Results are 
presented in Table 4 (also see Internet Appendix Table IA4 for the logit version of the results). 
We define settlements as cases where board seats were granted, but the activism did not proceed 
to a contested election (i.e., a proxy fight). We distinguish between activism events with and 
without formal proxy filings. In the former category of events, we find differences in coefficients 
between settled (Non-Proxy – Settled) and non-settled (Non-Proxy – Not Settled) cases (6.06 = 
12.09 – 6.03, p-value < 0.10). For cases with formal proxy filings, we distinguish cases that were 
not settled (Proxy – Not Settled), from cases that were settled before the shareholder meeting 
(Proxy – Not Settled) and cases that went to election (Proxy – Went to Election). The difference 
in the coefficient estimates for the first two cases is positive and significant as well (Proxy – 
Settled less Proxy – Not Settled = 13.18 – 4.97 = 8.21, p-value < 0.05), suggesting that settlement 
with activists is positively associated with turnover of directors. However, there is no significant 
difference between Proxy – Settled and Proxy – Went to Election (14.91 – 14.33 = 0.58, p-value 
= 0.87). Overall, these coefficients are consistent with boards deciding to settle in cases where 
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 Note that the effects are generally not significant when the sample includes firms that are delisted. This 
presumably reflects the fact that directors’ loss of such board seats is a function of acquisitions, etc., rather than of 
performance.  
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they are less likely to prevail in a proxy fight and with contested elections in proxy fights being 
just the tip of the iceberg in terms of driving director turnover.  
4.4 CEO turnover and outside directors 
One possible reason for outside director turnover is CEO turnover. A new CEO may seek 
to replace outside directors associated with prior management. To the extent that CEO turnover 
is associated with activism, the effect of activism on outside directors may simply reflect this 
association. To account for this possibility, we include a CEO turnover indicator as control in all 
our regressions involving outside directors and find that its inclusion does not affect inferences. 
In Table 5, we also interact CEO turnover with activism indicators.
11
 If activism is having an 
effect on outsider director turnover through the channel of CEO turnover, we expect the 
coefficients on these interactions to be positive. The coefficient on CEO Turnover interacted 
with Targeted Board – Proxy is 10.39 (p-value < 0.05), which is significantly greater than the 
coefficient on CEO Turnover alone. This suggests that outside director turnover following 
activism is not simply a function of CEO turnover and is consistent with activism leading to 
increased turnover of both CEOs and outside directors. 
5. Voting in director elections 
In this section we discuss how shareholder activism affects voting in director elections. 
We also assess the effect of voting on director turnover to relate the voting results to the findings 
in the previous section. 
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5.1 Determinants of shareholder support 
Shareholders can express displeasure with directors by withholding votes or, if 
applicable, by voting for an alternative candidate. We examine the effect on activism campaign 
on director election using the following model. 
Against Votes % = F (Targeted Firm – Non-Board, Targeted Board – Non-Proxy,  
 Targeted Board – Proxy, firm controls, (2)  
 director characteristics, activism characteristics, year fixed effects)  
 
The dependent variable is the extent of negative voting received by the director (Against 
Votes). Firm-level controls include industry-adjusted return, return on assets, sales growth, 
market value, book-to-market ratio, leverage, dividend payout ratio, the number of analysts, and 
institutional ownership percentage. Director-level controls include director age, director tenure, 
director shareholding, and audit and compensation committee position. We include voting 
recommendations by ISS (ISS Againstt+1), since ISS vote recommendation has been shown to 
have a significant influence on director elections (Cai et al., 2009).
12
  
In our first analysis we examine shareholder votes in the year of the activism campaign. 
Table 6 present results of regressions with a dependent variable Against Votest+1, the percentage 
of votes against the director in elections in the year of the shareholder activism. Columns 1 and 2 
present results when the sample includes all directors and columns 3 and 4 (5 and 6) present 
results for independent (inside) directors. As expected, directors in targeted firms receive more 
negative votes than directors of firms that are not targeted. The estimates suggest a significant 
increase over the mean negative vote for directors of non-targeted firms of about 5.4 percent (see 
Table 1 Panel D). These effects exist after controlling for unfavorable ISS recommendation (ISS 
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 Inferences are unaffected when ISS Againstt+1 is omitted. 
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Againstt+1) and votes against the director in the previous year (Against Votest) ), which is the year 
prior to activism, if any. 
 While meaningful, the extent of the negative vote is unlikely to directly lead to director 
turnover, e.g., by denying a majority for firms with majority-voting policies. But our results are 
consistent with either activists targeting firms whose shareholders are dissatisfied with their 
directors or the activists influencing shareholder perceptions of director performance. 
Interestingly, the effects are observed for all kinds of activism and there is no statistically 
significant difference between Targeted Firm – Non-Board and Targeted Board – Non-Proxy 
cases.
13
 
5.2 Do shareholder votes matter for board turnover? 
 In this sub-section we relate negative votes in director elections to director departure in 
the year after the vote. Prior research suggests that, while negative votes are not large in 
magnitude, directors appear to heed the message they deliver. Shareholder dissatisfaction 
expressed via negative votes is associated with subsequent governance and performance changes 
by firms, consistent with directors responding to shareholder disapproval. Cai, Garner, and 
Walking (2009) document a decrease in excess CEO compensation in the year following a higher 
negative vote for the compensation committee directors. They also find that the likelihood of 
CEO turnover increases when independent directors receive lower votes. Interestingly, Cai, 
Garner and Walking (2009) do not find an effect of votes against directors on director turnover. 
Fischer, Gramlich, Miller, and White (2009) show that firms whose directors receive fewer votes 
are more likely to experience subsequent CEO turnover and to hire an outside CEO. These firms 
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 We would have expected a greater level of negative voting in the cases involving proxy fights due simply to the 
existence of alternative candidates for shareholders to vote for. 
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also subsequently exhibit lower excess CEO compensation and make better acquisition and spin-
off decisions. Ertimur, Ferri, and Muslu (2011) show that excess CEO compensation declines 
following “vote no” campaigns. More recently, Fos, Li, and Tsoutsoura (2016) find evidence 
suggesting that directors are more sensitive to shareholder concerns when director elections are 
sooner. 
We extend our voting results and findings in the prior literature by examining whether 
negative votes are associated with subsequent director turnover in the presence of activism. 
Results of this analysis are presented in Table 7, where the dependent variable is the director 
turnover in the year after shareholder activism.
14
 Column 1 presents results from the 
specification used in Panel A of Table 2 with Departure(t,t+2) as the dependent variable, but with 
the sample restricted to the cases where we have data on voting in year t + 1. Columns 2, 3 and 4 
present results for all directors, independent directors and insider directors, respectively. The 
main variable of interest is Against Votest+1, which is the percentage of negative votes in the year 
of activism. The positive and significant coefficients on Against Votest+1 in all three columns 
show that directors, both independent ones and insiders, are less likely to depart if they receive 
greater support. While activism itself contributes to the greater extent of negative vote in year t + 
1, the effect of activism on director turnover exists even after controlling for the effect of 
negative shareholder votes. 
6. Directorships on other boards 
In this section, we consider the relation between activism and the positions on other 
boards of directors of affected firms. The impact of activism in the targeted firm on other 
directorships allows us to examine the reputational impact on directors of targeted firm and 
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inform the literature on reputational penalties for directors. Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen 
(1983) posit that firm performance affects directors’ reputations as corporate stewards, which are 
rewarded or penalized in the market for directorships. Prior papers have found evidence that 
directors lose their positions on other boards when they serve as directors of firms experiencing a 
financial crisis or financial misconduct (e.g., Srinivasan, 2005; Fich and Shivdasani, 2007; 
Ertimur, Ferri and Maber, 2012). As before, directors in firms in the Equilar database with no 
shareholder activism provide the baseline. We use the following regression specification. 
Other Boardst+2 = F(Targeted Firm – Non-Board, Targeted Board – Non-Proxy,  
Target Board – Proxy, firm controls, director characteristics,  
activism characteristics, year fixed effects) (3) 
    
The dependent variable is the number of other directorships held in year t + 2 by a director who 
was on the board in year t. The independent variables are as defined earlier.  
Table 8 presents results of an OLS regression of Equation 3. As before, we present results 
for the full board (Column 1 and 2), independent directors (Column 3 and 4) and inside directors 
(Column 5 and 6). In columns 1, 3, and 5, we find limited evidence of activism being associated 
with loss of seats on other boards. We find a small positive effect for all directors and 
independent directors for Targeted Firm – Non-Board and a small negative effect for all 
directors and independent directors for Targeted Board – Non-Proxy. One possible explanation 
for a positive coefficient is that independent directors have increased availability for other 
directorships when they lose a board seat and are more likely to lose a board seat when the firm 
is targeted. To account for this possibility, we include an indicator for departure from the 
targeted board—Departure(t, t+2)—and interact this with the activism indicators. These results are 
in columns 2, 4, and 6. The coefficient on Departure(t, t+2) for independent directors (Column 3) 
is not economically nor statistically significant. For inside directors (Column 4), the coefficient 
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on Departure(t, t+2) (coef. = 0.05, p-value < 0.01) plausibly reflects executives gaining other 
board seats when they lose their positions independent of activism, but we find limited effects of 
activism when the executive loses his or her seat (e.g. Targeted Board – Non-Proxy × 
Departure(t, t+2), coef. = –0.10, p-value < 0.05). The statistically insignificant coefficients on 
Targeted Firm – Non-Board × Departure(t, t+2) and Targeted Board – Non-Proxy × Departure(t, 
t+2) in Column 4 provide no evidence for the notion that activism could lead to more directorships 
at other firms when it results in loss of a board seat for an independent director. Overall, Table 8 
provides no evidence of directors bearing reputational costs through loss of other directorships 
following shareholder activism. 
7. Analysis of individually targeted directors 
In this section we examine the consequences for the directors who are specifically 
targeted by shareholder activism involving proxy fights. We identify directors as targeted 
directors (Targeted Board – Proxy – Targeted Director) if they are either (i) explicitly named as 
a target by activists or, (ii) when activists do not explicitly identify the directors they seek to 
replace, those directors that are up for election during an activism year. Appendix C provides 
examples of each type.  
Panel A of Table 9 presents results from a regression analogous to those in Panel A of 
Table 2. We focus on Departure(t+1, t+2) as the dependent variable, as a director generally needs to 
be on the board at the time of activism (year t + 1) to be explicitly or implicitly targeted, so 
turnover of targeted directors is only possible from t + 1. The coefficient on Targeted Board – 
Proxy – Targeted Director is large and significant (21.34, p-value < 0.01), which suggest that the 
targeted directors are 21 percentage points (19 and 35 percentage points for independent and 
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inside directors, respectively) more likely to leave the board by the year after activism than non-
targeted directors (21.34– 7.08 = 14.26, p-value < 0.01). 
Panel B of Table 9 presents regressions analogous to those in Table 6, where the 
dependent variable is Other Boardst+2. We find no evidence that directors suffer reputational 
consequences from being individually targeted.  
In short, Table 7 presents evidence consistent with consequences for individually targeted 
directors being greater in terms of loss of seats on the targeted firm, but provides no evidence of 
reputational consequences in the form of loss of directorships on other boards. 
8. Additional analyses: Causal inference and robustness 
One issue with the results presented above is that activists are unlikely to target firms at 
random and it is difficult to control for all determinants of activists’ targeting decisions, as it is 
likely that some of these are not observable by us. If some of these omitted determinants are 
correlated with director turnover, our estimates will be biased.  In this section we provide 
additional tests of our prior results using within-firm analysis and a propensity score matched 
sample.  
8.1 Within-firm analyses 
With a view to providing stronger evidence for a causal explanation for our results, we 
conduct two sets of within-firm analyses that focus on directors on boards of two distinct sets of 
firms. 
The first set of firms comprises those with staggered boards and the second set comprises 
non-staggered boards. The presence of a staggered board means that only some directors will be 
nominated for election during the activism event and we find that it is these nominated directors 
that are targeted by activists (see Example 2 of Appendix C for an instance of this). This gives 
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rise to within-firm variation in whether an individual director was targeted that is plausibly 
exogenous, as there is no reason to expect that the class of directors up for election in the year of 
activism to be inherently different from the other classes of directors.
15
 Estimating a regression 
using such firms and including firm-year fixed effects allows us to estimate the effect of being a 
targeted director independent of any characteristics that led the firm to be targeted in the first 
place. As such, estimated coefficients from this regression are more plausibly capturing the 
causal effect of activism. We use ISS Voting Analytics to identify directors who were subject to 
a director election in the year of activism (t + 1).  
Table 10 presents results from this analysis. Columns 1 to 3 present results for sample 
firms that have staggered boards. Columns 1 and 2 include firm fixed effects and firm and year 
fixed effects, respectively. We find that directors of targeted firms (Targeted Firm) are more 
likely to leave their boards within three months of the shareholder meeting when the firm is 
subject to activism (coefficient = 2.67 in Column 1, p-value < 0.01). Further, we find that being 
up for election (Up for Election) is positively associated with director turnover; directors up for 
election are more likely to have left the board within three months following shareholder 
meetings (coefficient = 3.95 in column 1, p-value < 0.01). In column (3), we include firm-year 
fixed effects and the coefficient on Targeted Firm × Up for Election remains positive and 
significant. This suggests that our director turnover results are not simply a function of being up 
for election, but are plausibly a consequence of activism.  
To complete the picture we also consider the set of firms with non-staggered boards and 
again include firm-year fixed effects to isolate the impact on targeted directors controlling for 
firm characteristics. Columns 4, 5, and 6 present these results where we regress director turnover 
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one caveat to our analysis. 
 31 
on Targeted Director. Given that all directors are up for election in each year, activists who seek 
board positions through proxy fights generally explicitly identify the directors who their 
candidates would replace (e.g., Example 1 of Appendix C). Columns 4, 5, and 6 include firm, 
firm and year, and firm-year fixed effects, respectively. Estimates in columns 4 and 5 show that 
our earlier results from Table 9 Panel A are robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects and firm 
and year fixed effects, respectively. In column 6, we find that explicitly targeted directors are 
indeed more likely to turn over (coefficient 10.39, p-value < 0.05) than their colleagues (i.e., 
directors at the same firm in the same year) who were not targeted. As explicitly targeted 
directors are deliberately selected by activists, they are plausibly the ones most likely to suffer 
broader reputational consequences from being targeted.  
In Table 10 panel B we examine the impact of activism on other directorships of targeted 
directors using the same fixed effects design as discussed in Panel A results above. For staggered 
boards (columns 1 to 3) we find no effect on targeted firm directors or for the interaction of 
targeted firm with directors up for election (Targeted Firm × Up for Election). Similarly, we find 
no effect on these variables in non-staggered boards (columns 4 to 6). These results suggest that 
there is no reputational impact on other directorships from activism consistent with our results in 
Table 8 and Table 9 panel B. 
We also confirm that our findings are robust to an alternative within-firm research design 
used by Fos and Tsoutsoura (2014). The results of this analysis—reported in Table IA7 of the 
Internet Appendix—are consistent with our main analyses. In particular, while we find 
significant effects of activism on a director’s seat on the board of the targeted firm, we find no 
evidence of reputation effects manifesting in the number of directorships on other boards. 
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While consistent with our earlier results, these inferences are quite different from those in 
Fos and Tsoutsoura (2014), who find evidence consistent with directors’ seats on other boards 
being negatively affected by proxy fights in which they are up for election. As discussed in the 
Internet Appendix, our analysis suggests that these differences in inferences are not attributable 
to research design, but are possibly attributable to differences in sample period and data source 
(i.e., Fos and Tsoutsoura (2014) use BoardEx, which includes unlisted and non-profit boards).
16
 
8.2 Propensity score matching 
To confirm that our results are not driven by significant differences between targeted and 
non-targeted firms that are not effectively controlled for in a linear regression framework, we 
employ a propensity score matching procedure to achieve covariate balance between the 
treatment (targeted) and control (non-targeted) firms. We create a control sample of directors 
whose firms were not targeted, but comparable on all observed covariates to a treatment sample 
of directors whose firms were targeted by activists. We first use a logit regression using the 
control variables from Table 2 to estimate the probability (propensity score) that a firm would be 
targeted by an activist (Pr(Targeted Firm)) and match each targeted firm with a non-targeted 
firm from the same year with the nearest propensity score. Then we compare the difference in 
outcome variables (in particular, Departure(t, t+2), Other Boardst+2) for the treatment and control 
firms. We verify that difference in means for each covariate after the match is insignificant, 
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 The average number of other directorships in Fos and Tsoutsoura (2014) is 2.2, which is significantly greater than 
our 0.613 for non-targeted firms and 0.689 for firms targeted for shareholder activism. This difference is likely 
attributable to Fos and Tsoutsouras’s inclusion of directorships in private companies. We follow most prior research 
in considering only public companies, as this is where the reputational effect is expected to be stronger. Our 
numbers are fairly consistent with prior research. For example, Fich and Shivdasani (2007) report 0.95 other 
directorships for a sample of sued firms in 2002, and Ertimur et al. (2012) report 0.797 other directorships for their 
sample of firms.  
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implying covariate balance between the treatment and control samples. We present the covariate 
balance in the internet appendix (see Table IA6). 
Results for director turnover are presented in Panel A of Table 9. Consistent with our 
results in Table 2 Panel A, directors of targeted firms have higher likelihood of leaving the board 
of a targeted firm (estimated effect of 0.089, p-value < 0.01) than directors of matched firms, the 
estimated effect increases as the activism becomes more board-related (estimated effects for 
Targeted Board – Non-Proxy and Targeted Board – Proxy of 0.105 and 0.131 respectively, both 
with p-values < 0.01) and targeted at individual directors (coefficient = 0.137, p-value < 0.01).  
Results for other directorships are presented in Panel B of Table 11. These are consistent 
with those found in Table 9 Panel B. When the number of directorships held by a director on 
other boards is the outcome, the differences in means are small and statistically insignificant, 
consistent with our earlier results. 
9. Conclusions 
We examine career consequences for directors when firms are subject to activist 
shareholder interventions. First, we study director turnover on the board of the firm subject to 
activism, including whether activism increases director turnover-performance sensitivity. Next, 
we examine voting outcomes for directors in elections to assess if shareholders express their 
displeasure through their votes. We then examine the role of voting in precipitating departures of 
targeted directors. Finally, we examine reputational consequences of shareholder actions by 
looking at changes in the number of board positions held by directors at other public firms.  
Our results suggest that directors exit boards at higher rates when their firms are targeted 
by activists: 18.0 percent of directors are no longer on the boards of firms targeted for 
shareholder activism at the end of the year after the activism event compared to 12.5 percent for 
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firms that are not targets of activism. Unsurprisingly, directors targeted by activists in proxy 
fights are significantly more likely to leave the board after the activism event. We find that 
directors not directly targeted by dissident shareholders are also likely to leave the board, as are 
directors at targeted firms even when no board-related demands are made as part of the activism, 
let alone a formal proxy fight. All these results hold after controlling for factors driving director 
turnover and targeting by activists. The increased turnover exists for both inside and independent 
directors. 
Activism is associated with higher performance sensitivity of director turnover: the 
association between industry-adjusted stock returns and director turnover is greater when a firm 
is targeted by activists. We also find that shareholder voting matters for director turnover. 
Directors that receive a greater negative vote percentage in the year of shareholder activism are 
less likely to remain on the board in the year after activism. This finding may provide some relief 
to critics of corporate governance who argue that shareholder voting is ineffective in disciplining 
directors: Directors appear to heed the message in the negative vote and resign, though it is 
unclear what compels them to do so given that they receive majority support in most cases.  
Director reputation as measured by number of directorships at other firms is not 
associated with activism. Neither proxy fights nor other forms of shareholder activism have any 
apparent association with the number of other directorships in the year after the activism event. 
Even directly targeted directors experience no loss of other directorships and the lack of 
association holds for both inside and independent directors.  
Our paper provides evidence consistent with shareholder activism imposing career costs 
on directors, even when such activism is not directed explicitly at board representation and does 
not result in a proxy contest.  Evidence from prior research suggests that proxy contests are not 
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an effective mechanism for disciplining boards since they rarely succeed in getting a majority of 
shareholder support. Our results suggest that activists need not even engage in, let alone win, 
proxy contests to remove directors. Overall, while we do not find evidence of broader 
reputational consequences, our results are consistent with shareholder activism increasing board 
turnover and accountability for poor performance. 
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Appendix A. Variable definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Classification of activism events 
Targeted Firm Indicator for firm being targeted by an activism event commencing in a 
given fiscal year (Source: FactSet SharkRepellent) 
Targeted Firm – Non-
Board 
All activism events that are neither Targeted Board – Proxy nor Targeted 
Board – Non-Proxy 
Targeted Board – Non-
Proxy 
Activism events not included in Targeted Board – Proxy, but identified by 
SharkRepellent as relating to “Board Representation,” “Board Control,” 
“Remove Directors(s),” or “Withhold Vote for Director(s).” 
Targeted Board – Proxy (i) Activism events identified based on SEC filings on Form DEFC14A or 
PREC14A filed by dissident and (ii) activism events where the dissident 
publicly disclosed that it delivered formal notice to the company that it 
intends to solicit proxies from stockholders 
Targeted Board – Proxy – 
Targeted Director (also 
Targeted Director) 
Indicator for a director being either (i) up for election during an activism 
year when dissidents do not explicitly identify the directors they seek to 
replace or (ii) explicitly named as a target by activists 
Targeted Board – Proxy – 
Non-Targeted Director 
Indicator for a director being involved in a proxy fight (Targeted Board – 
Proxy), but not being individually targeted by activists 
 
Classification of activism events by settlement (Table 3 Panel B) 
Non-Proxy – Settled Indicator for a non-proxy fight event resulting in a board seat for dissidents, 
but did not go to shareholder election 
Non-Proxy – Not Settled Indicator for a non-proxy fight event not resulting in board seats for 
activists 
Proxy – Settled Indicator for a proxy fight event resulting in a board seat for dissidents, but 
not going to shareholder election 
Proxy – Not Settled Indicator for a proxy fight event not resulting in any board seats for activists 
Proxy – Went to Election Indicator for a proxy fight going to shareholder election 
 
Dependent variables 
Departure(t, t+2) Indicator for the director leaving the board of the firm between years t and t 
+ 2 (i.e., the year after the activism event, if any) 
Against Votest+2 Percentage of votes against the director in director elections in year t + 2 
(votes against + votes withheld) / (votes for + votes against + votes 
withheld) 
Other Boardst+2 Number of directorships a director has with companies other than the 
company of interest in year t + 2 
 
Firm controls 
Ind.-Adj. Return Twelve-month industry-adjusted return, calculated as raw return minus the 
return for the relevant Fama/French 48-industry portfolio 
ROA EBITDA divided by lagged total assets 
Sales Growth Sales divided by lagged sales 
Market Value Natural log of market capitalization 
Leverage Sum of long-term debt and current liabilities divided by sum of long-term 
debt, current liabilities and the book value of common equity 
Variable Definition 
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CEO Turnover Indicator for CEO Turnover in year t + 1 
 
Dividend 
 
Sum of common dividends and preferred dividends divided by earnings 
before depreciation, interest, and tax 
Analyst Number of analyst forecasts for each firm-year (Source: I/B/E/S) 
Institution Percentage of shares held by institutions (Source: WhaleWisdom) 
 
 
Director characteristics  
Age Director’s age in year t 
Tenure Number of years a director served on the firm’s board at time t 
Percent Owned Number of shares held by a director divided by shares outstanding at fiscal 
year-end (Source: Equilar) 
Audit Committee Indicator for the director being on the audit committee at time t 
Compensation Committee Indicator for the director being on the compensation committee at time t 
Independent Director Indicator for director being independent 
ISS Againstt+2 Unfavorable recommendation by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) in 
year t + 2 for each individual director nominee 
Up for Election Indicator for the director up for election in year t + 1 (Source: ISS Voting 
Analytics) 
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Appendix B: Activism classification – examples 
 
Case 1: Firm is targeted for activism but not for board-related issues  
(Targeted Firm and Targeted Firm – Non-Board) 
Target: Bioenvirion, Inc. 
Dissident: Elliott Management Corporation 
Dates: 5/30/2007 – 10/4/2007 
Proposals/Outcome: Campaign to vote against company’s acquisition by Genzyme Corporation 
for $5.60 per share.  Court granted company’s petition to reconvene the special meeting and re-
open the polls.  At the reconvened special meeting the merger was approved. 
Target: 99 Cents Only Stores 
Dissident: Akre Capital Management LLC  
Dates: 1/4/2008 – 9/18/2008 
Proposals/Outcome: Campaign urged board to concentrate resources on markets other than 
Texas. Company announced on 9-18-2008 it will exit the Texas market. 
 
Case 2. Firm is targeted for a board related issue not resulting in a proxy fight  
(Targeted Firm and Targeted Board – Non-Proxy) 
Target: American Bank Note Holographics, Inc. 
Dissident: Levy, Harkins & Co., Inc. 
Dates: 3/30/2007 – 5/24/2007 
Proposals/Outcome: Dissident seeking 5 of 5 seats on the company’s board and threatened a 
formal proxy fight if the company failed to address its concerns. Later company settled with the 
Dissident whereby 2 dissident nominees were appointed on the board. 
Target: Exide Technologies 
Dissident: Soros Fund  
Dates: 12/22/2004 – 4/19/2005 
Proposals/Outcome: Dissident met with company to discuss its operating and board concerns. 
Company appointed one dissident nominee to nine-person board and submitted proposals to 
declassify the board and to allow 15% of shareholders to call special meetings.  
Target: Southwest Gas Corporation 
Dissident: GAMCO Asset Management Inc. (2/18/2004 – 5/6/2004) 
Proposals/Outcome: Dissident campaign to nominate Salvatore J. Zizza to board. Dissident did 
not solicit proxies for its nominee, but instead nominated candidate from the floor of the annual 
meeting. Company’s nominees overwhelmingly elected to Board. 
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Case 3. Firm is target of a proxy fight which is settled without going to a shareholder vote 
(Targeted Firm, Targeted Board – Proxy and Proxy – Settled) 
Target: Alloy, Inc.  
Dissident: Becker Drapkin Management LP/Kleinheinz Capital Partners, Inc. 
Dates: 3/17/2010 – 7/15/2010 
Proposals/Outcome: Proxy fight for three board seats settled.  Company increased the size of the 
board by one seat and appointed a dissident nominee to fill the vacancy. 
Target: The Brink’s Company  
Dissident: MCM Management, LLC 
Dates: 11/30/2007 – 5/2/2008 
Proposals/Outcome: Proxy fight for four board seats settled, with company agreeing to nominate 
two dissident representatives at the 2008 annual meeting and announcing plans to spin-off its 
Home Security Unit.  
 
Case 4. Firm is target of a proxy fight that goes to a shareholder vote 
(Targeted Firm, Targeted Board – Proxy and Proxy – Went to Election) 
Target: Blockbuster Inc.  
Dissident: Icahn Associates Corp. 
Dates: 4/8/2005 – 5/11/2005 
Proposals/Outcome: Dissident slate elected, winning three of three seats up for election to seven-
member board).  
Target: Alaska Air Group, Inc.  
Dissident: Richard D. Foley/Stephen Nieman/Terry K. Dayton/William Davidge 
Dates: 3/20/2006 – 5/16/2006 
Proposals/Outcome: Three-person dissident slate defeated (management won all four seats up 
for election to twelve-person board). Management’s proposals to declassify board and remove 
supermajority vote for mergers was passed and implemented.  
Case 5. Firm is target of a proxy fight that is not settled, but does not go to a shareholder vote 
(Targeted Firm, Targeted Board – Proxy and Proxy – Not Settled) 
Target: Friendly Ice Cream Corporation 
Dissident: Biglari Capital Corp. 
Dates: 11/8/2006 – 6/17/2007 
Proposals/Outcome: Proxy fight to elect two people to the five-person board at the 2007 annual 
meeting was withdrawn after company agreed to be acquired. Dissident entered into agreement 
to vote for the merger. 
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Appendix C: Identification of targeted directors – examples 
 
In some proxy fights, dissidents specifically name on DEFC14A filings those directors they seek to 
replace with their own nominees, in which case we consider these directors as explicitly targeted. In other 
cases, dissident do not specify the directors they are trying to replace, but we infer the targeted directors 
from proxy filings by management. We recognize those director nominees as implicitly targeted.  
Example 1: Explicitly Targeted Directors 
Target: Lions Gate Entertainment Corp. Dissident: Carl C. Icahn Duration: 12/6/2010 – 12/14/2010 
 
Excerpt from DEFC14A filed by Carl C. Icahn: 
“If no specification is made, your shares will be voted (i) FOR Mr. Jay Firestone; (ii) FOR Dr. Michael 
Dornemann; (iii) FOR Mr. Christopher J. McGurk; (iv) FOR Mr. Daniel A. Ninivaggi; (v) FOR Dr. 
Harold T. Shapiro; (vi) FOR the persons who have been nominated by Lions Gate to serve as directors, 
OTHER THAN Mr. Michael Burns, Mr. Harald Ludwig, Mr. G. Scott Paterson, Mark H. Rachesky, M.D. 
and Mr. Hardwick Simmons.” 
 
Full list of director nominees from DEFC14A filed by Lions Gate Entertainment Corp.: 
 
Management 
Nominees 
Targeted Director Management 
Nominees 
Targeted Director 
Michael Burns 
Harald Ludwig 
G. Scott Paterson 
Mark H. Rachesky 
Hardwick Simmons 
True 
True 
True 
True 
True 
 
Norman Bacal 
Arthur Evrensel 
Jon Feltheimer 
Frank Giustra 
Morley Koffman 
Daryl Simm 
Phyllis Yaffe 
False 
False 
False 
False 
False 
False 
False 
 
Example 2: Implicitly Targeted Directors 
Target: Target Corp. Dissident: Pershing Square LP Duration: 4/21/2009 – 5/28/2009 
 
Excerpt from DEFC14A filed by Target Corp. 
“Proxies solicited by the Board of Directors will, unless otherwise directed, be voted for the election of 
four nominees to serve as Class III directors for three-year terms expiring in 2012 and until their 
successors are elected. The four nominees are Mary N. Dillon, Richard M. Kovacevich, George W. 
Tamke, and Solomon D. Trujillo. All of the nominees are currently directors and have consented to be 
named in this proxy statement and to serve if elected.” 
 
Excerpt from DEFC14A filed by Pershing Square LP 
“PROPOSAL 2A:  To elect William A. Ackman, Michael L. Ashner, James L. Donald and Richard W. 
Vague as directors of Target Corporation.” 
 
Management Nominees Targeted Director 
Mary N. Dillon 
Richard M. Kovacevich 
George W. Tamke 
Solomon D. Trujillo 
True 
True 
True 
True 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Activism events by year 
This panel reports number of activism events by year. Our sample of targeted firms comes from 
FactSet SharkRepellent. Activism events that do not involve board related demands by the 
activist are classified as Targeted Firm – Non-Board. Targeted Board – Non-Proxy are board of 
directors related activism events identified by SharkRepellent as relating to “Board 
Representation,” “Board Control,” “Remove Directors(s),” or “Withhold Vote for Director(s)” 
but that do not lead to a declared proxy contest. Targeted Board – Proxy are declared proxy 
contests including both (i) activism events involving filings on forms DEFC14A and PREC14A 
and (ii) activism events where the dissident publicly disclosed that it delivered formal notice to 
the company that it intends to solicit proxies from stockholders. Proxy Fight Went to Election, a 
subset of Targeted Board – Proxy, are those declared proxy contests that went to a shareholder 
vote. We match data on directorships in Equilar (sourced from proxy filings) with activism 
events that begin in the twelve-month period after proxy filings. 
 
 
Year 
Activism events matched to Equilar 
  
Targeted Firm Targeted Firm 
– Non-Board 
Targeted 
Board – Non-
Proxy 
Targeted 
Board – Proxy 
Proxy Fight 
Went to 
Election 
 2004 67 32 7 28 10 
 2005 126 72 18 36 9 
 2006 229 137 31 61 17 
 2007 291 200 38 53 22 
 2008 256 147 40 69 26 
 2009 131 69 22 40 15 
 2010 158 92 30 36 12 
 2011 142 75 27 40 10 
 2012 90 52 24 14 0 
 
Total 1,490 876 237 377 121 
 
Panel B: Director observations by year and activism category 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Targeted Firm 586 1,116 1,950 2,556 2,230 1,133 1,437 1,200 813 13,021 
 Targeted Firm – Non-Board 286 651 1,128 1,734 1,269 619 863 628 496 7,674 
    Targeted Board – Non-Proxy 72 150 268 328 351 179 273 216 210 2,047 
    Targeted Board – Proxy 228 315 554 494 610 335 301 356 107 3,300 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (cont.) 
Panel C: Director departure 
We classify directorship-year observations on Equilar into categories based on activism related 
to the firm in the subsequent year (t + 1). See Panel A for explanation of the classification of 
activism events. Non-Targeted Firm comprises all firms in Equilar database that were not 
targeted by activists.  
 
Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
Non-Targeted Firm 0.000 0.070 0.125 0.166 0.199 0.223 
Targeted Firm 0.000 0.118 0.180 0.209 0.215 0.214 
    Targeted Firm – Non-Board 0.000 0.107 0.157 0.185 0.190 0.186 
    Targeted Board – Non-Proxy 0.000 0.136 0.209 0.221 0.246 0.252 
    Targeted Board – Proxy 0.000 0.132 0.214 0.256 0.256 0.258 
Panel D: Shareholder support in director elections 
Against Votes represents the percentage of votes against the director in director elections, 
calculated as (votes against + votes withheld) divided by (votes for + votes against + votes 
withheld). ISS Against represents an unfavorable recommendation by Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) for each individual director nominee. See Panel A for explanation of the 
classification of activism events. Non-Targeted Firm comprises all firms in Equilar database that 
were not targeted by activists. 
 
Against 
Votest 
Against 
Votest+1 
Against 
Votest+2 
ISS  
Againstt+1 
ISS 
Againstt+2 
 Non-Targeted Firm 0.052 0.054 0.057 0.104 0.103 
 
Targeted Firm 0.075 0.086 0.081 0.138 0.135 
 
    Targeted Firm – Non-Board 0.073 0.076 0.081 0.110 0.143  
    Targeted Board – Non-Proxy 0.079 0.100 0.092 0.120 0.118 
 
    Targeted Board – Proxy 0.080 0.096 0.072 0.207 0.125 
 
Panel E: Number of directorships in other firms 
The panel indicates the number of directorships a director has with companies other than the 
company of interest each year. See Panel A for explanation of the classification of activism 
events. 
 
Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
Non-Targeted Firm 0.610 0.592 0.583 0.571 0.560 0.546 
Targeted Firm 0.688 0.679 0.653 0.630 0.608 0.579 
    Targeted Firm – Non-Board 0.734 0.729 0.713 0.685 0.653 0.620 
    Targeted Board – Non-Proxy 0.649 0.625 0.570 0.546 0.545 0.516 
    Targeted Board – Proxy 0.605 0.593 0.565 0.554 0.539 0.519 
Year-on-year ratio (Non-Targeted)  0.970 0.985 0.979 0.981 0.975 
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Table 2: Effect of shareholder activism on director turnover 
Panel A: Entire sample 
The table presents results from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is Departure(t, t+2), 
i.e., an indicator for the director leaving the board of the firm by year t + 2 (i.e., the year after the 
activism event, if any). Column 1 presents OLS results for all directors where the firm is present 
in year t + 2 in the Equilar database. Columns 2 through 5 exclude observations where the firm is 
not in Equilar in year t + 2, presumably due to bankruptcy, delisting, mergers, etc. All variables 
are defined in Appendix A. All regressions include year fixed-effects and robust standard errors 
(in parentheses) clustered at the firm level. *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 
10%) level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  All directors, 
all firms 
All directors All directors Departure 
(t, t+1) 
Departure 
(t+1, t+2) 
Targeted Firm 16.23
***
 8.88
***
    
 
(1.38) (0.90)    
Targeted Firm – Non-Board   6.67*** 4.48*** 2.19*** 
 
  (1.10) (0.84) (0.70) 
Targeted Board – Non-Proxy   9.97*** 4.85*** 5.11*** 
 
  (1.75) (1.22) (1.37) 
Targeted Board – Proxy   12.77*** 3.14*** 9.63*** 
 
  (1.53) (1.01) (1.18) 
Control Variables      
Ind. Adj. Return -1.68
***
 -0.77
***
 -0.75
***
 -0.35
***
 -0.41
***
 
 (0.25) (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.08) 
ROA -11.30
***
 -7.50
***
 -7.49
***
 -3.66
***
 -3.83
***
 
 (1.35) (0.84) (0.84) (0.48) (0.46) 
Sales Growth 0.84 0.88
***
 0.90
***
 0.25 0.66
***
 
 
(0.54) (0.32) (0.32) (0.21) (0.21) 
Market Value -9.31
***
 0.00 0.01 -0.20 0.21 
 (0.48) (0.28) (0.28) (0.16) (0.14) 
Book-to-Market 3.08
***
 1.04
***
 1.02
***
 0.59
***
 0.43
**
 
 (0.54) (0.35) (0.35) (0.21) (0.20) 
Leverage 4.69
***
 0.75 0.78 0.36 0.43 
 (0.86) (0.50) (0.50) (0.29) (0.26) 
Dividend -18.87
*
 0.75 1.11 3.84 -2.73 
 (10.72) (6.27) (6.27) (4.01) (3.40) 
Analyst 0.14
***
 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
Institution 0.13 1.74
***
 1.73
***
 0.83
***
 0.90
***
 
 (0.25) (0.19) (0.19) (0.11) (0.10) 
Age 0.21
***
 0.31
***
 0.31
***
 0.16
***
 0.15
***
 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tenure -0.05
**
 0.08
***
 0.08
***
 0.05
***
 0.03
***
 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Audit Committee -3.03
***
 -3.86
***
 -3.86
***
 -2.62
***
 -1.24
***
 
 (0.23) (0.21) (0.21) (0.13) (0.11) 
 46 
Compensation Committee -0.99
***
 -1.28
***
 -1.27
***
 -1.16
***
 -0.11 
 (0.23) (0.21) (0.21) (0.13) (0.11) 
Independent Director -2.50
***
 -2.39
***
 -2.40
***
 -1.03
***
 -1.37
***
 
 (0.37) (0.31) (0.31) (0.19) (0.16) 
Adj. R
2
 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Num. obs. 297,202 245,774 245,774 245,774 245,774 
 
F-Test for Column (3) 
H0: Targeted Firm – Non-Board = Targeted Board – Non-Proxy for All Directors 
F-stat = 2.76, Pr(>F) = 0.10
* 
H0: Targeted Board – Non-Proxy = Targeted Board – Proxy for All Directors 
F-stat = 1.66, Pr(>F) = 0.20 
H0: Targeted Firm – Non-Board = Targeted Board – Proxy for All Directors 
F-stat = 12.48, Pr(>F) = 0.00
***
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Table 2: Effect of shareholder activism on director turnover (cont.) 
Panel B: Independent and inside directors 
The table presents results from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is Departure(t,t+2), 
i.e., an indicator for the director leaving the board of the firm by year t + 2 (i.e., the year after 
then activism event, if any) with the sample partitioned into independent and inside directors, as 
classified by Equilar (no results are provided for related directors). Columns 1 and 4 present 
results for directors where year t + 2 is covered by Equilar, even when the firm is not on Equilar 
in year t + 2, presumably due to bankruptcy, delisting, mergers, etc.. The remaining columns 
include only observations where the firm is in the Equilar database in t + 2. Control variables 
include all variables in Panel A of Table 2 and are suppressed for parsimony. All regressions 
include year fixed-effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the firm level. 
*** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Independent 
directors, 
all firms 
Independent 
directors 
Independent 
directors 
Inside 
directors, 
all firms 
Inside 
directors 
Inside 
directors 
Targeted Firm 16.30
***
 8.29
***
  16.54
***
 11.81
***
  
 (1.43) (0.93)  (1.84) (1.62)  
Targeted Firm – Non-
Board 
  6.73
***
   7.65
***
 
  (1.16)   (1.87) 
Targeted Board – Non-
Proxy 
  7.87
***
 
  
16.44
***
 
  (1.84) 
  
(3.64) 
Targeted Board – 
Proxy 
  11.57
***
 
  
18.67
***
 
  (1.61)   (2.92) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2
 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.03 
Num. obs. 211,696 174,858 174,858 53,691 44,146 44,146 
 
F-Test for Column (3) of Table 2 Panel B 
H0: Targeted Firm – Non-Board = Targeted Board – Non-Proxy for All Directors 
F-stat = 0.31, Pr(>F) = 0.58
 
H0: Targeted Board – Non-Proxy = Targeted Board – Proxy for for All Directors 
F-stat = 2.65, Pr(>F) = 0.10 
H0: Targeted Firm – Non-Board = Targeted Board – Proxy for All Directors 
F-stat = 6.78, Pr(>F) = 0.01
***
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F-Test for Column (6) of Table 2 Panel B 
H0: Targeted Firm – Non-Board = Targeted Board – Non-Proxy for All Directors 
F-stat = 4.96, Pr(>F) = 0.03
** 
H0: Targeted Board – Non-Proxy = Targeted Board – Proxy for for All Directors 
F-stat = 0.26, Pr(>F) = 0.61 
H0: Targeted Firm – Non-Board = Targeted Board – Proxy for All Directors 
F-stat = 11.48, Pr(>F) = 0.00
***
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Table 3: Impact of activism on performance-sensitivity of director turnover 
The table presents results from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is Departure(t,t+2), i.e., an 
indicator for the director leaving the board of the firm by year t + 2 (i.e., the year after then activism 
event, if any). Ind. Adj. Return is the industry-adjusted return, calculated as raw return minus the return 
for the relevant Fama/French 48-industry portfolio, over the 12-month period ending 4 months after the 
fiscal year-end (i.e., the approximate time of the annual meeting). Control variables include all variables 
in Panel A of Table 2 and are suppressed for parsimony. All regressions include year fixed-effects and 
robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the firm level. *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 
1% (5%, 10%) level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
All  
directors 
All 
directors 
Independent 
directors 
Independent 
directors 
Inside 
directors 
Inside 
directors 
Targeted Firm 8.84
***
  8.31
***
  11.82
***
  
 (0.85)  (0.90)  (1.52)  
Targeted Firm – Non-Board  6.85***  6.91***  7.90*** 
 
 (1.04)  (1.13)  (1.77) 
Targeted Board – Non-Proxy  8.18***  6.35***  12.85*** 
 
 (1.78)  (1.88)  (3.76) 
Targeted Board – Proxy  12.46***  11.46***  18.26*** 
 
 (1.68)  (1.85)  (2.97) 
Targeted Firm -2.79
***
  -2.44
***
  -3.19
**
  
× Ind. Adj. Return (0.81)  (0.88)  (1.44)  
Targeted Firm – Non-Board 
× Ind. Adj. Return 
 -2.23
***
  -2.05
**
  -2.27
*
 
 (0.74)  (0.80)  (1.34) 
Targeted Board – Non-Proxy 
× Ind. Adj. Return 
 -9.61
**
  -8.86
*
  -18.32
*
 
 (4.90)  (5.15)  (10.05) 
Targeted Board – Proxy 
× Ind. Adj. Return 
 -2.31  -1.50  -1.81 
 (4.16)  (5.07)  (5.86) 
Ind. Adj. Return -1.07
***
 -1.07
***
 -0.83
***
 -0.83
***
 -1.95
***
 -1.95
***
 
 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.44) (0.44) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2
 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Num. obs. 255,031 255,031 181,196 181,196 45,964 45,964 
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Table 4: Impact of settlement on director turnover  
The table presents results from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is Departure(t,t+2), 
i.e., an indicator for the director leaving the board of the firm by year t + 2 (i.e., the year after the 
activism event, if any). Non-Proxy – Settled and Proxy – Settled are indicators for non-proxy 
fight and proxy fight events, respectively, where an activism event resulted in a board seat for 
dissidents, but did not go to shareholder election. Non-Proxy – Not Settled and Proxy – Not 
Settled are indicators for non-proxy fight and proxy fight events, respectively, where an activism 
event did not result in any board seat for dissidents. Proxy - Went to Election is an indicator 
variable for those proxy fights that went to election. All activism classification variables are 
mutually exclusive. All columns exclude observations when the firm is not on Equilar in year t + 
2, due to bankruptcy, delisting, mergers, etc. Column 1 presents results for all directors, Column 
2 presents results for independent directors and Column 3 presents results for inside directors. 
Control variables include all variables in Panel A of Table 2 and are suppressed for parsimony. 
All regressions include year fixed-effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at 
the firm level. *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
All directors Independent 
directors 
Inside 
directors 
Targeted Firm – Non-Board 6.67*** 6.73*** 7.65*** 
 (1.10) (1.16) (1.87) 
Non-Proxy – Not Settled 6.03** 5.96** 8.82 
 (2.47) (2.76) (5.37) 
Non-Proxy – Settled 12.09*** 8.86*** 21.17*** 
 (2.26) (2.37) (4.67) 
Proxy – Not Settled 6.65*** 4.97** 14.94*** 
 (2.05) (2.11) (5.18) 
Proxy – Settled 14.33*** 13.18*** 20.81*** 
 (2.32) (2.41) (4.31) 
Proxy – Went to Election 14.91*** 13.99*** 18.82*** 
 (2.88) (3.11) (5.19) 
Equality of coefficients: p-values   
Non-Proxy – Settled 
= Non-Proxy – Not Settled 
0.07
*
 0.42 0.08
*
 
Proxy – Settled  
= Proxy – Not Settled 
0.01
**
 0.01
***
 0.39 
Proxy – Went to Election  
= Proxy – Settled 
0.87 0.84 0.76 
Proxy – Went to Election  
= Proxy – Not Settled 
0.01
**
 0.01
**
 0.59 
Controls Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2
 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Num. obs. 245,774 174,858 44,146 
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Table 5: Impact of CEO turnover on independent director turnover 
The table presents results from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is Departure(t,t+2), 
i.e., an indicator for the director leaving the board of the firm by year t + 2 (i.e., the year after 
then activism event, if any). All columns exclude observations where the firm is not on Equilar 
in year t + 2, presumably due to bankruptcy, delisting, mergers, etc. Column 1 and 2 presents 
results for independent directors. Control variables include all variables in Panel A of Table 2 
and are suppressed for parsimony. All regressions include year fixed-effects and robust standard 
errors (in parentheses) clustered at the firm level. *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% 
(5%, 10%) level. 
 (1) (2) 
 Independent 
directors 
Independent 
directors 
Targeted Firm 6.56
***
  
 (0.91)  
Targeted Firm – Non-Board  5.33*** 
  (1.12) 
Targeted Board – Non-Proxy  6.81*** 
  (1.88) 
Targeted Board – Proxy  8.98*** 
  (1.57) 
CEO Turnover 5.39
***
 5.39
***
 
 (0.50) (0.50) 
Targeted Firm 
× CEO Turnover 
8.09
***
  
(2.98)  
Targeted Firm – Non-Board 
× CEO Turnover 
 7.53
*
 
 (4.21) 
Targeted Board – Non-Proxy 
× CEO Turnover 
 3.64 
 (5.56) 
Targeted Board – Proxy 
× CEO Turnover 
 10.39
**
 
 (4.55) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2
 0.03 0.03 
Num. obs. 174,858 174,858 
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Table 6: Shareholder activism and director elections 
The table presents results from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is Against 
Votest+1, the percentage votes against the director in director elections in the year of activism (t + 
1), if any. Columns 2, 4, and 6 include Against Votest, shareholder opposition for the director in 
the year before activism, and ISS Againstt+1, an indicator for an ISS recommendation to withhold 
votes from a director in year t + 1.  Columns 1 and 2 present results for all directors, Columns 3 
and 4 present results for independent directors and Columns 5 and 6 present results for inside 
directors. Firm-level controls are industry-adjusted return, return on assets, sales growth, market 
value, book-to-market ratio, leverage, dividend payout ratio, the number of analysts, and 
institutional ownership. Director-level controls are director age, director tenure, and audit and 
compensation committee position. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Controls are 
suppressed for parsimony. All regressions include year fixed-effects and robust standard errors 
(in parentheses) clustered at the firm level. *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 
10%) level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Dependent Variable: Against Votest+1 
 All 
directors 
All 
directors 
Ind. 
directors 
Ind. 
directors 
Inside 
directors 
Inside 
directors 
Targeted Firm – Non-
Board 
5.49
***
 3.28
***
 4.28
***
 2.63
***
 6.88
***
 3.18
***
 
(0.57) (0.59) (0.61) (0.67) (0.83) (0.78) 
Targeted Board – Non-
Proxy 
1.92
***
 1.67
***
 2.02
***
 1.59
***
 1.69
***
 1.43
*
 
(0.45) (0.52) (0.47) (0.52) (0.60) (0.75) 
Targeted Board – Proxy 4.31*** 3.25*** 4.50*** 2.87** 3.74*** 3.44** 
 
(1.00) (1.25) (1.06) (1.22) (1.34) (1.54) 
Against Votest 3.84
***
 4.26
***
 4.04
***
 4.18
***
 3.90
***
 3.97
***
 
 (0.71) (1.08) (0.79) (1.19) (1.11) (1.43) 
ISS Againstt+1  35.46
***
  34.36
***
  38.73
***
 
  (1.85)  (2.06)  (3.17) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2
 0.04 0.16 0.05 0.14 0.02 0.20 
Num. obs. 131,297 80,591 97,199 59,376 22,964 14,572 
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Table 7: Shareholder activism, director elections, and director turnover 
The table presents results from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is Departure(t,t+2), 
i.e., an indicator for the director leaving the board of the firm by year t + 2 (i.e., the year after the 
activism event, if any). Classification into independent and inside directors comes from Equilar 
(no results are provided for related directors). Against Votest+1 represents shareholder opposition 
for the director in the year of activism. Columns 1 and 2 study all directors while Column 3 
focuses on independent directors and Column 4 focuses on insider directors. We include all 
control variables from Panel A of Table 2 but these are not tabulated for parsimony. All 
regressions control for year fixed-effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at 
the firm level. *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All directors All directors Independent 
directors 
Inside 
directors 
Targeted Firm – Non-Board 2.84** 2.69** 2.71** 4.70* 
 
(1.17) (1.17) (1.29) (2.67) 
Targeted Board - Non-Proxy 5.79
**
 5.50
*
 3.01 14.66
**
 
 
(2.92) (2.93) (3.07) (6.02) 
Targeted Board - Proxy 9.91
***
 9.57
***
 9.99
***
 5.67 
 
(2.88) (2.85) (3.21) (4.96) 
Against Votest+1  7.81
***
 7.29
***
 15.86
***
 
 
 (1.61) (1.74) (4.47) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Num. obs. 100,688 100,688 73,718 17,811 
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Table 8: Impact of shareholder activism on other directorships 
The table presents results from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is Other Boardst+2, 
which is the number of directorships a director has with firms other than the firm of interest in 
year t + 2 (i.e., the year after then activism event, if any). Columns 1 and 2 present results for all 
directors. Columns 3 and 4 present results for independent directors and Columns 5 and 6 present 
results for inside directors. Firm-level controls include industry-adjusted return, return on assets, 
sales growth, market value, book-to-market ratio, leverage, dividend payout ratio, the number of 
analysts, and institutional ownership. Director-level controls include director age, director tenure, 
and audit and compensation committee position. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All 
regressions include year fixed-effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the 
firm level. *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. Intercept is not 
tabulated. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All 
directors 
All 
directors 
Ind. 
directors 
Ind. 
directors 
Inside 
directors 
Inside 
directors 
Other Boardst 0.76
***
 0.76
***
 0.76
***
 0.77
***
 0.74
***
 0.75
***
 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Targeted Firm – Non-Board 0.04
***
 0.02
**
 0.05
***
 0.03
**
 0.02 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Targeted Board – Non-Proxy -0.04
***
 -0.03
*
 -0.03
*
 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Targeted Board – Proxy -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Departure(t, t+2)  0.00  -0.00  0.05
***
 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
Targeted Firm – Non-Board 
        × Departure(t, t+2) 
 0.02  0.04  0.04 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.04) 
Targeted Board – Non-Proxy  
        × Departure(t, t+2) 
 -0.01  0.01  -0.10
**
 
 (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.05) 
Targeted Board – Proxy 
        × Departure(t, t+2) 
 -0.02  -0.03  0.02 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.04) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2
 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.57 0.58 
Num. obs. 309,265 307,773 217,780 216,882 57,609 57,171 
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Table 9: Impact of shareholder activism on individually targeted directors 
Panel A: Effects on director turnover 
The table presents results from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is Departure(t+1, 
t+2), i.e., an indicator for the director who was on the board in year t + 1 leaving the board by year 
t + 2 (i.e., the year after the activism event, if any). Targeted Board – Proxy – Targeted Director 
is an indicator for targeted directors who are either (i) up for election during an activism year 
when dissidents do not explicitly identify the directors they seek to replace or (ii) explicitly 
named as a target by activists. Targeted Board – Proxy – Non-Targeted Director is an indicator 
for the rest of directors in Targeted Board – Proxy. Observations where the firm is not on Equilar 
in year t + 2, presumably due to bankruptcy, delisting, mergers, etc. are excluded. We include all 
control variables from Panel A of Table 2 but these are not tabulated for parsimony. All 
regressions include year fixed-effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the 
firm level. *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All directors Independent 
directors 
Inside directors 
Targeted Firm – Non-Board 1.90
***
 2.13
***
 1.50 
 (0.70) (0.80) (1.11) 
Targeted Board – Non-Proxy 5.06
***
 4.87
***
 7.29
***
 
 (1.37) (1.51) (2.75) 
Targeted Board – Proxy  7.08
***
 7.11
***
 6.02
***
 
    –  Non-Targeted Director (1.08) (1.22) (2.20) 
Targeted Board – Proxy 21.34
***
 18.88
***
 34.66
***
 
    –  Targeted Director (3.71) (4.11) (7.34) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2
 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Num. obs. 245,774 174,858 44,146 
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Table 9: Impact of shareholder activism on targeted directors (cont.) 
Panel B: Other directorships 
The table presents results from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is how many 
directorships a director has with firms other than the firm of interest in year t + 2 (i.e., the year 
after then activism event, if any). Targeted Board – Proxy – Targeted Director is an indicator for 
targeted directors who are either (i) up for election during an activism year when dissidents do 
not explicitly identify the directors they seek to replace or (ii) explicitly named as a target by 
activists. Targeted Board – Proxy – Non-Targeted Director is an indicator for the rest of 
directors in Targeted Board – Proxy. Columns 1 and 2 present results for all directors. In 
Columns 2, 4, and 6 we include interaction variables with Departure(t,t+2), i.e., an indicator for 
the director leaving the board of the firm by year t + 2 (i.e., the year after the activism event, if 
any). Columns 3 and 4 present results for independent directors and Columns 5 and 6 present 
results for inside directors. All control variables from Table 6 are included but not tabulated for 
parsimony. All regressions include year fixed-effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses) 
clustered at the firm level. *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All 
directors 
All 
directors 
Ind. 
directors 
Ind. 
directors 
Inside 
directors 
Inside 
directors 
Other Boards 0.76
***
 0.76
***
 0.76
***
 0.77
***
 0.74
***
 0.75
***
 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Targeted Firm – Non-Board 0.04*** 0.02** 0.05*** 0.03** 0.02 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Targeted Board – Non-Proxy -0.04*** -0.03* -0.03* -0.03 -0.03 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Targeted Board – Proxy  -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 
    –  Non-Targeted Director (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Targeted Board – Proxy 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.07 
    –  Targeted Director (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) 
Departure(t,t+2)  0.00  -0.00  0.05
***
 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
Targeted Firm – Non-Board 
 × Departure(t,t+2) 
 0.02  0.04  0.04 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.04) 
Targeted Board – Non-Proxy  
 × Departure(t,t+2) 
 -0.01  0.00  -0.10
**
 
 (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.05) 
Targeted Board – Proxy 
    –  Non-Targeted Director 
 × Departure(t,t+2) 
 -0.03  -0.03  0.03 
 (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
Targeted Board – Proxy 
    –  Targeted Director 
 × Departure(t,t+2) 
 -0.01  0.02  -0.08 
 (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.08) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2
 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.57 0.58 
Num. obs. 309,265 307,773 217,780 216,882 57,609 57,171 
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Table 10. The effect of proxy fights on directorships: Within-firm analysis 
Panel A: Effects on director turnover 
This table reports results from OLS regression where the dependent variable is Departure in 3 
months, i.e., an indicator for the director leaving the board of the firm by 3 months from 
shareholder meeting date following activism (i.e., the year after the activism event). Sample 
comprises director-years of firms with staggered boards for the first three columns and director-
years of firms with non-staggered boards for the last three columns. Up for Election indicates 
that the director was up for director election according to ISS Voting Analytics in year t + 1. 
Targeted Director indicates that the director was targeted by activists due to being explicitly 
targeted by activists. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *** (**, *) indicates 
significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
 
Staggered  
boards 
Non-staggered  
boards 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Departure 
in 3 months 
Departure 
in 3 months 
Departure 
in 3 months 
Departure 
in 3 months 
Departure 
in 3 months 
Departure 
in 3 months 
Targeted Firm 2.67
***
 3.20
***
  4.60
***
 6.22
***
  
 
(0.83) (0.81)  (0.70) (0.68)  
Up for Election 3.95
***
 3.64
***
 3.48
***
    
 (0.19) (0.17) (0.13)    
Targeted Firm  
× Up for Election 
3.11
**
 3.20
**
 3.17
***
    
(1.43) (1.41) (1.05)    
Targeted Director    8.15
*
 8.24
*
 10.39
**
 
    (4.34) (4.37) (4.04) 
Fixed effects Firm Firm & Year Firm-Year Firm Firm & Year Firm-Year 
 Adj. R
2
 0.18 0.33 0.67 0.16 0.27 0.59 
Num. obs. 106,974 106,974 106,974 106,123 106,123 106,123 
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Table 10. The effect of proxy fights on directorships: Within-firm analysis 
Panel B: Other directorships 
This table reports results from OLS regression where the dependent variable is Other Boardst+2, 
which is the number of directorships a director has with firms other than the firm of interest in 
year t + 2 (i.e., the year after then activism event, if any). Sample comprises director-years of 
firms with staggered boards for the first three columns and director-years of firms with non-
staggered boards for the last three columns. Up for Election indicates that the director was up for 
director election according to ISS Voting Analytics in year t + 1. Targeted Director indicates that 
the director was targeted by activists due to being explicitly targeted by activists. Numbers in 
parentheses are robust standard errors. *** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) 
level. 
 
Staggered  
boards 
Non-staggered  
boards 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Other 
boardst+2 
Other 
boardst+2 
Other 
boardst+2 
Other 
boardst+2 
Other 
boardst+2 
Other 
Boardst+2 
Other Boards 0.75
***
 0.75
***
 0.76
***
 0.75
***
 0.75
***
 0.76
***
 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Targeted Firm -0.02 -0.01  0.02 0.03
**
  
 
(0.02) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01)  
Up for Election 0.01
***
 0.01
***
 0.01
**
    
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Targeted Firm  
× Up for Election 
-0.01 -0.01 0.00    
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
Targeted Director    0.04 0.04 0.00 
    (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
Fixed effects Firm Firm & Year Firm-Year Firm Firm & Year Firm-Year 
 Adj. R
2
 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.70 0.70 0.73 
Num. obs. 100,617 100,617 100,617 95,427 95,427 95,427 
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Table 11. Propensity score matching analysis 
Panel A: Effect of shareholder activism on director turnover 
The table presents results from analysis using propensity score matching. Coefficients represent 
estimated effect on Departure(t,t+2), i.e., an indicator for the director leaving the board of the firm 
by year t + 2 (i.e., the year after the activism event, if any) of being targeted by activists in the 
respective category relative to directors at non-targeted firms. One control firm is selected for 
each treated firm using propensity scores and exact matching on years. Propensity scores are 
estimated using a logit regression where the dependent variable is an indicator for being targeted 
and the independent variables are the controls reported in Panel A of Table 2. *** (**, *) 
indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
All directors 
Independent 
directors 
Inside 
directors 
Targeted Firm 0.089
***
 0.081
***
 0.127
***
 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.016) 
N (Treatment) 8,015 5,840 1,336 
Targeted Firm – Non-Board 0.067
***
 0.064
***
 0.071
**
 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.020) 
N (Treatment) 4,520 3,237 790 
Targeted Board – Non-Proxy 0.105
***
 0.081
***
 0.154
***
 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.045) 
N (Treatment) 1280 947 201 
Targeted Board – Proxy 0.131
***
 0.106
***
 0.165
***
 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.033) 
N (Treatment) 2215 1,656 345 
Targeted Director 0.137
***
 0.104
***
 0.167
***
 
 (0.029) (0.032) (0.071) 
N (Treatment) 423 328 60 
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Table 11. Propensity score matching analysis (cont.) 
Panel B: Effect of shareholder activism on other directorships  
The table presents results from analysis using propensity score matching. Coefficients represent 
estimated effect on how many directorships a director has with firms other than the firm of 
interest in year t + 2 (i.e., the year after then activism event, if any) of being targeted by activists 
in the respective category relative to directors at non-targeted firms. One control firm is selected 
for each targeted firm using propensity scores and exact matching on years. Propensity scores are 
estimated using a logit regression where the dependent variable is an indicator for being targeted 
and the independent variables are the controls reported in Panel A of Table 2. *** (**, *) 
indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All directors Independent 
directors 
Inside 
directors 
Targeted Firm 0.007 0.003 0.039 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.023) 
N (Treatment) 11,714 8,561 1,957 
Targeted Firm – Non-Board 0.006 0.028 0.033 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.031) 
N (Treatment) 6,934 5,025 1,194 
Targeted Board – Non-Proxy -0.005
**
 -0.031 0.058 
 (0.031) (0.037) (0.052) 
N (Treatment) 1,754 1,301 274 
Targeted Board – Proxy 0.022 0.030 -0.006 
 (0.024) (0.030) (0.046) 
N (Treatment) 3,026 2,235 489 
Targeted Director 0.011 -0.051 0.201
***
 
 (0.048) (0.061) (0.079) 
N (Treatment) 703 514 144 
 
 
 
